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ABSTRACT
Many studies on public international law and peace have focused on the role self-
determination played in bringing about independence and liberty in third-world 
countries. Besides self-determination, this article seeks to investigate the dilemma 
surrounding the right to remedial secession and its inability to lead to peace in 
Africa. Political leadership in Africa is encountering numerous human rights vio-
lations, discrimination and marginalisation, which has led to civil conflicts. In the 
search for peace and security, many people have been clamouring for the right 
to secession but unfortunately, peace has remained a tragedy on the continent. 
By analysing whether the right to remedial secession entails automatic peace, 
this article reveals that most rights to secession granted to many communities in 
Africa do not lead to peace. It is argued that granting the right to secession in a 
community where there is lack of political will and patriotism, in a community 
divided along tribal lines, and a community marred by deep-rooted corruption 
and nepotism; will not bring about peace and security. Thus, there is need for 
Africans to have strong political will and be more patriotic, and overcome cor-
ruption, ethnicity and nepotism for the remedial right to lead to peace. To arrive 
at these assertions, the article adopted a qualitative research analysis with an 
exploratory approach.
INTRODUCTION
From South Sudan and Sudan in the northern part of Africa all the way to Cameroon 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Central Africa, from Kenya to Somaliland 
and Somalia, and to Ethiopia in the east and Horn of Africa; the right to secession 
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as an option to end ethnic violence and civil war transfuses every day’s news. The 
right to secession as a concept in international law literature is believed to be a 
remedy for people suffering from violent conflict that was fuelled by marginalisa-
tion and discrimination. It is conceived as an alternative to conflict and thus helps 
achieve peace and security. Scholars have argued that many of the ethnic violence 
and civil wars revolve around the issues of a lack of inclusiveness and discrimination 
of political  leaders.
Brilmayer says that although some ethnic struggles concern issues of domestic politi-
cal fairness, many involve secessionist claims (Brilmayer 1991:177). He further argues 
that secessionists’ demands, unlike claims about domestic political fairness, cannot be 
satisfied through domestic political reforms; instead, they aim to redraw the politi-
cal boundaries (Brilmayer 1991:177). It is vital to note that while discrimination, and 
marginalisation that fuelled violence and civil wars; might be used as a driving force 
towards claiming secession, cases drawn from Africa have shown that secessionists 
are actually driven by hidden agendas; not necessarily the search for peace. Today 
in the media all over Africa and beyond, the cries and tears for the South Cameroon 
people claiming secession from Cameroon is overwhelming. South Cameroon accuses 
Paul Bia’s government of marginalisation and discrimination; therefore, it wants its own 
autonomy and independence from his political leadership.
Similarly, the same secession sentiments are currently echoed by the followers of the 
former Prime Minister, Raila Odinga. Members of his coalition political party named 
National Super Alliance (NASA), together with his community; unsatisfied with the 
outcome of the 2017 general elections, and their perception that their presidential can-
didate Raila Odinga would not make it to the presidency; echoed on media claiming 
secession statements. This means that anybody who seems to have failed to reach his 
own personal political interest reverts to secession as a last resort. If secession would 
lead to peace why has South Sudan never experienced a moment of peace and yet 
secession that separated them from Sudan took place?
The perception exists that the right to secession enshrined in the literature on public 
international law, helps countries undergoing civil and ethnic wars to achieve peace; 
remains a mystery in Africa. The central question the article seeks to answer is: does 
the right to secession as applied to civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Africa under the 
parameters of the international law entail an automatic peace? Hence, the aim of this 
article is to explore the dilemma surrounding the right of secession and its inability to 
lead to peace in Africa. This will be substantiated by the many examples and lessons 
drawn from Africa to confirm and affirm that the right to secession does not necessar-
ily lead to conflict resolution or peace in Africa.
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This article starts by discussing the conceptual and theoretical details surrounding the 
concept of secession. This is done by exploring the notion or the right to self-determi-
nation as it leads to the right of secession. This is because one cannot talk of secession 
without mentioning the notion of self-determination. Hereafter, it is stipulated that due 
to the lack of patriotism and political will on the side of Africans and their leaders the 
right of secession has difficulty in leading to peace and security on the continent. The 
second part of the article explores factors that cause the right to secession accorded 
to secessionists not leading to peace and security, rather intensifying conflicts on the 
continent. The third part of the article explores selected examples of current African 
states that were granted the right of secession to secede from their mother countries 
in the search for peace and yet have not experienced a moment of peace. The article 
concludes by asserting unless the mindsets of Africans and their leaders are changed 
and transformed, the right to secession does not necessarily guarantee peace and se-
curity in Africa.
Why and what is so unique about some minority groups and many other people when 
unhappy with any political leadership talk about marginalisation and discrimination to 
justify their quest for the right to secede? Is secession a guarantee to peace, and when 
exactly and under what circumstances does the right to secession lead automatically to 
peace? These are important and complex questions.
THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The right to self-determination is a concept that has a strong appeal. It is an essential 
norm of international law which is reflected both in treaty law and customary interna-
tional law (Vezbergaite 2011:2). It gives people a free choice which allows them to de-
termine and conduct their own destiny (Franck, et al. 1992:248). Cop and Eymirlioglu 
mentioned in their work that the right to self-determination was “the touchstone for 
peacemakers at Versailles” (Cop and Eymirlioglu 2003:116). Later on, it was explicitly 
embraced by the United States’ President Woodrow Wilson, by Lenin and others, and 
became the guiding principles of the reconstruction of Europe following World War I 
(Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9).
It is also argued by Malcolm (2003) that the primary appearance of the principle of 
self-determination materialised after the First World War (Malcolm 2003:225). It is fur-
ther argued that the right to self-determination was incorporated into the 1941 Atlantic 
Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which later evolved into the United 
Nations (UN) Charter (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9). Its inclusion in the UN Charter 
marked the universal recognition of the principle as fundamental to the maintenance 
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of friendly relations and peace among states (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9). Self-
determination is recognised as a right of all peoples in the first article common to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which both came into force in 1976 (Van Walt 
and Seroo 1998:9–11). For a better understanding, Michael and Onno quote para-
graph 1 of the above-mentioned article which provides: “all peoples have the right 
to self-determination and by virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (Van Walt 
and Seroo 1998:9–11). This means that self-determination is a right which all people 
regardless their ethnic, religious, cultural backgrounds are entitled to.
Van Walt and Onno continue that the right to self-determination of people has 
been recognised in many other international and regional instruments, including the 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, the Helsinki 
Final Act adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 
1975, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, the CSCE Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe adopted in 1990, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action of 1993 (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:10). Furthermore, it has been affirmed by 
the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case, the Western Sahara case and 
the East Timor case, in which its egregious character was confirmed (Van Walt and 
Seroo 1998:10). Moreover, the scope and content of the right to self-determination has 
been elaborated upon by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and numerous leading international jurists (Van 
Walt and Seroo 1998: 9). Based on the above, it means that the right to self-determi-
nation is well established and recognised by all as a right to all people. This leads us 
to the next point of tracing the historical background of the right to self-determination.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
The origin of the principle of self-determination can be traced back to the American 
Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789, which marked 
the demise of the notion that individuals and peoples, as subjects of the kings, were ob-
jects to be transferred, alienated, ceded, or protected in accordance with the interests 
of the monarch (Cassese 1995:11). The raison d’être of the self-determination principle, 
as explained; lies in the American and French insistence that the government be re-
sponsible to the people. And as a concept, self-determination was born and destined to 
play a major role in the development of the international community (Cassese 1995:13).
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A number of important studies on self-determination have been conducted and sum-
marised into three stages. Carley argues that while the first stage of self-determination 
referred to decolonisation, the second did not apply to people but to territories (Carley 
1996:5). Carley further argued that the third stage of self-determination was considered 
an absolute right though, again, for colonies only; this marked a significant change 
from the previous era (Carley 1996:5). At this stage, one can understand that self-
determination did not allow for secession; instead, the territorial integrity of existing 
states and most colonial territories was assumed (Carley 1996:6–7). This means that 
self-determination could only apply to colonies which were suffering from external op-
pression from their imperialist masters. Hannum says that the right to self-determination 
applies only to the peoples under foreign domination and do not apply to sovereign 
independent states (Hannum 1996:41–42). The point to understand is that the nature 
of self-determination during this period was not that all peoples had the right to it, but 
that all colonies had the right to be independent (Carley 1996:6–7).
In addition, Carley argues that the third, and most problematic, era in the development 
of the concept began with the end of decolonisation in the late 1970s and continues 
to the present (Carley 1996:8–9). This stage is characterised by the attempt in recent 
decades to fuse the first two eras; that is, to combine the ethnic and cultural rights 
of minorities that Wilson, the former USA President championed with the territorial 
absolutism of decolonisation (Carley 1996:10). Carley further argues that the result has 
been a tendency to redefine self-determination to mean that every distinctive ethnic or 
national group has a right to independence (Carley 1996:11). Although self-determina-
tion has taken on this new meaning in a popular sense, it is good to note that it remains 
a contentious and controversial topic in the nationalism and public international law 
literature (Cop and Eymirlioglu 2003:116).
The study by Kumbaro on the Helsinki Final Act highlights that the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted on 1 August 1975, embodied a 
Declaration on the Principles Concerning Mutual Relations of the participating states, 
which contains in its Principle VIII an explicit reference to internal and external self- 
determination (Kumbaro 2001:20). The study further argues that: “by virtue of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples have the right in 
full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political 
status, without external political interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, 
economic, social and cultural development” (Kumbaro 2001:20).
This means that that the right to self-determination is a continuous right, not a right ex-
ercised, once and for all, at the time of independence. One can therefore understand 
that as formulated by the above provision, self-determination applies to all people and 
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all the time. The question that one can seek to understand is the causes of self-deter-
mination, and to what extent it leads to the right of remedial secession, and whether 
the right to secession guarantees the peace and security that people long for when 
fighting for their liberty or freedom.
CAUSES OF SELF-DETERMINATION
In examining the causes behind the outbreak of self-determination movements, sev-
eral realities of today’s world simply cannot be ignored. For example, Carley notes 
that existing borders between internationally recognised nation-states are artificial, 
arbitrary, and accidental, not permanent as well (Carley 1996:12). Second, although 
some states, mostly in the West, are a reflection of the congruence of ethnic and ter-
ritorial boundaries, most are not so constituted (Carley 1996:12). The other states are 
typically mini-empires or even greater empires of ethnically distinct peoples who find 
themselves arbitrarily forced to live within the same borders (Carley 1996:12).
Third, the current concern over self-determination is not merely a post-Soviet blip; 
that is, the dilemma is not just a regional, short-term phase following the break-up of 
the Soviet Union (Carley 1996:12). Here the argument is that many people all over 
the globe are going through their own process of self-discovery. As people discover 
themselves and their entitled rights, they also discover how oppressed they are and 
thus long for freedom. So, these people seek liberation to get back to their roots. And 
in many cases this liberation requires the right to self-determination which if conditions 
are met leads to the right of secession. This is the current case in South Cameroon and 
Kenya after the general elections of 8 August 2017.
The article argues that globalisation is another cause of self-determination in the sense 
that it gives people international awareness. Globalisation has brought the world to-
gether; it has to some extent removed boundaries. The growing international aware-
ness is that things do not have to be the way they are, as identity groups discover that 
they no longer have to endure intolerable forms of government. This awareness has 
been accelerated by the contemporary application of the Western heritage of democ-
racy and human rights, and the peculiarly American notion of individual fulfilment 
(Carley 1996:16).
It is important to note that the revolutionary developments in mass communications 
and social media are largely responsible for the spread of these ideas. In many instanc-
es, the introduction of such democratic values as “freedom of speech, assembly, and 
the press are accelerating the development of minority group’s self-awareness and, in 
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some cases, demands for greater autonomy or even independence” (Carley 1996:14). 
In addition, there is a new kind of globalised elite that is increasingly alienated from 
the suffering masses (Carley 1996:15). This brings us to the next point of analysing 
whether self-determination implies an automatic right to secession.
DOES SELF-DETERMINATION ENTAIL AN 
AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO SECESSION?
The literature on public international law demonstrates that outside of the decolonisa-
tion context, the right to self-determination is recognised by the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Dugard 2005:103). This means that the right 
to self-determination becomes a universal right by granting remedial secession to all 
peoples who prove to be undergoing oppression and/or marginalisation. In Article 27 
of ICCPR, it is stated that minorities are not denied this right but they may only exercise 
it together with other members of their group (Dugard 2005:103). Capotorti defines 
minority as a “group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the State, in 
a non-dominant position, whose members being nationals of the State possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population 
and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their 
culture, traditions, religion or language” (Capotorti 1979:878).
By recognising the people as a whole, and minorities within that whole, the Covenant 
recognises not only the right to external self-determination but also the right to internal 
self-determination (Sohn 1982:50). External self-determination is an affirmation of the 
right within the decolonisation context favouring territorial integrity, and internal self-
determination is the confirmation of the right to freedom in the post-decolonisation 
process. This means all people including minorities within the state after it has gained 
independence. And internal self-determination is the synthesis and sum of human 
rights (Kiwanuka 1988:76).
It does not generically mean the right to self-governance; but rather, the right to freely 
choose a government while exercising all the freedoms that make the choice possible 
(Kiwanuka 1988:76). Kiwanuka argues further that the right to internal self-determina-
tion serves to protect all people’s individual human rights; hence it is the ultimate ex-
ercise of collective human rights and may be construed as a universal right (Kiwanuka 
1988:76). Simpson argues that the territorial integrity of a country is only secured on 
the democratic representation of the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour. If all people within a state are not democrati-
cally represented for example; every ethnic group within the state is not accorded the 
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legal right to take part in the democratic process by the state’s municipal laws and 
the state’s territorial integrity is not guaranteed by international law. Thus, territorial 
integrity is only guaranteed to the extent that it safeguards the interests of the people 
within the territory (Simpson 1996:283).
In this light, secession is highly permitted and granted. As Simpson argues, secession, 
in the context of the contemporary right to self-determination, must be viewed as a 
remedy of last resort, which is an exercise of collective human rights aimed at se-
curing basic individual human rights, where the colonial model of self-determination 
has failed (Simpson 1996:283). For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Reference to the secession of Quebec case found that international law contained nei-
ther a right of unilateral secession nor an explicit denial of such a right (Supreme Court 
of Canada Report 1998:37). This means that in the case of Quebec, secession was 
not permitted because it fell short on criteria that could allow it to occur. This leads 
us to the next point of evaluating the criteria of secession and whether the right to the 
remedial secession resulting from the right to self-determination does entail automatic 
peace and security.
CRITERIA OF REMEDIAL SECESSION
As earlier argued, the term secession is understood as the action of separating or mov-
ing away from something which has existed for some period of time. For that separa-
tion to occur, criteria have to be put in place. This is the reason why self-determination 
does not entail an automatic right to secession (external self-determination) thus right 
to secession is permitted in very limited and extreme circumstances. Buchanan points 
out, there are two ways of deliberating over the issue of secession, the first being “mor-
al reasoning about the conditions for an entity to have a right to secede, disregarding 
institutional requirements”, and, second, “reasoning about the legitimate criteria for 
secession within the framework of international institutions and a morally defensible 
system of international law” (Buchanan 1997:32).
In exploring the literature on secession, Raic recognises and outlines some important 
criteria that lead to a qualified right to secession in very particular circumstances:
“(1) there must be a people which, though forming a numerical minority in rela-
tion to the rest of the population of the parent state, forms a majority within an 
identifiable part of the territory of that state;
(2) the people in question must have suffered grievous wrongs at the hand of the 
parent state from which it wishes to secede consisting of either: a serious violation 
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or denial of the right of internal self-determination of the people concerned; and/
or serious and widespread violations of the fundamental human rights of the 
members of that people; and
(3) there must be no further realistic and effective remedies for the peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict” (Raic 2002:108).
Therefore, this article affirms that South Sudan’s secession from North Sudan in 
2011, Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan in 1971, Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia 
in 1993; and the dissolution of Yugoslavia into Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia; fully complied with the above criteria. The international 
community and the literature on public international law had no option other than to 
recognise them. In the case of secession attempts by Katanga from the former Congo 
(now called Democratic Republic of Congo) and Quebec (from Canada) it did not 
take place because they did not fully comply with the above criteria. These secession 
attempts lacked support from the UN and international law and thus were seriously 
condemned, and failed to take place.
Raz and Margalit say that the right to secede constitutes of primary right theories 
which construct the right to secession as a remedy for injustices, that is, as derivative 
upon the violation of other rights (Raz and Margalit 1990:87). They further argue that 
this right constitutes of remedial right theories which to the contrary, posit that a right 
unilaterally to secede exists per se, independently from the violation of other rights 
(Raz and Margalit 1990:87). In many cases, the right to secede ends up being granted 
mainly on the basis of nationality. It is important to note that remedial right theories 
of secession, unlike national self-determination and choice-theories, are built on the 
premise that secession is not a primary right of all peoples, but rather a remedial right 
that applies in a restricted number of cases, where certain conditions are met (Norman 
2006:21–35).
This article argues that secession should speak to the wrongs suffered by a group, thus 
being justified only if some kind of injustice is present; as was the case of Kosovo in 
Serbia, South Sudan in Sudan. In some other cases, this injustice can result from a 
past annexation to which the group has never consented (such as annexation of the 
Baltic states by the USSR), or from an unfair treatment by the government such as the 
cases of Eritrea and South Sudan. This resulted in the lack of protection of their basic 
rights, security, a failure to safeguard the legitimate political and economic interests of 
their region, or a persistent discriminatory redistribution. Bauböck adds to the list of 
injustices that can justify secession violations of federal agreements and of distinctive 
collective rights (Bauböck 2000).
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DOES THE RIGHT TO REMEDIAL 
SECESSION GUARANTEE PEACE?
Babbit argues that the majority of contemporary civil wars take place within states 
rather than between them, and in many of these cases self-determination crises are 
at the heart of the conflict (Babbit 2006:185). For example, in 2011 in 52 conflicts 
the quest to secede was a root cause of tensions, while in 73 per cent of conflicts 
with secessionist backgrounds violence escalated (Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research 2011:2–5). Scholars have argued that the right to secession has to be 
understood as a right to resistance and defence against injustices committed against a 
group by the encompassing state (Buchanan 2003:217–221; Moore 2003:5–6; Norman 
2003:41). This means that, this right is used as a way of resolving internal conflicts and 
bring peace. This argument is captured by Locke who argued that the right to seces-
sion gives the people a “right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment 
of a new legislative to provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for 
which they are in society” (Locke 1889: 307).
Yates (1998) and Pavkovic (2003) in their studies have identified several types of seces-
sion. They also highlighted a number of ways in which a political entity can secede 
from the larger or original state. These ways include:
●● Secession from federation or confederation versus secession from a unitary state.
●● Colonial aka wars of independence from a mother country or imperial state.
●● National (seceding entirely from the national state) versus local (seceding from 
one entity of the national state into another entity of the same state).
●● Central or enclave (seceding entity is completely surrounded by the original 
state) versus peripheral (along a border of the original state).
●● Secession by contiguous units versus secession by non-contiguous units 
(exclaves).
●● Separation or partition versus dissolution. Irredentism where secession is sought 
in order to annex the territory to another state because of common ethnicity or 
prior historical links.
●● Minority (a minority of the population or territory secedes) versus majority (a 
majority of the population or territory secedes). Secession of better off regions 
versus secession of worse off regions.
The literature shows that the threat of secession is in many cases used as a strategy 
to gain greater autonomy within the original state. For example, Buchanan, a theo-
rist of secession, argues that secession has been used to achieve political interests of 
certain individuals. Hence it fails to achieve its original goals of peace and security 
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(Buchanan 1991:87–123). His argument is supported and confirmed by the case of 
South Sudan whereby secession from Sudan has not yet brought peace to the country. 
It rather fuelled internal conflict among the South Sudanese people. Buchanan offered 
a number of arguments that are mainly used against secession: “Protecting legitimate 
expectations of those who now occupy territory claimed by secessionists, even in 
cases where that land was stolen. Self-defense if losing part of the state would make it 
difficult to defend the rest of it. Protecting majority rule and the principle that minori-
ties must abide by them. Minimisation of strategic bargaining by making it difficult to 
secede, such as by imposing an exit tax. Soft paternalism because secession will be 
bad for secessionists or others. Threat of anarchy because smaller and smaller entities 
may choose to secede until there is chaos, although this is not the true meaning of the 
political and philosophical concept. Preventing wrongful taking such as the state’s pre-
vious investment in infrastructure. Distributive justice arguments that wealthier areas 
cannot secede from poorer ones” (Buchanan 1991:87–123).
Pavkovic (2003) describes five justifications for a general right of secession within lib-
eral political theory:
“(1) Anarcho-Capitalism: individual liberty to form political associations and pri-
vate property rights together justify right to secede and to create a “viable political 
order” with like-minded individuals.
(2) Democratic secessionism: the right of secession, as a variant of the right of self-
determination, is vested in a “territorial community” which wishes to secede from 
“their existing political community”; the group wishing to secede then proceeds to 
delimit “its” territory by the majority.
(3) Communitarian secessionism: any group with a particular “participation-en-
hancing” identity, concentrated in a particular territory, which desires to improve 
its members’ political participation has a prima facie right to secede.
(4) Cultural secessionism: any group which was previously in a minority has a 
right to protect and develop its own culture and distinct national identity through 
seceding into an independent state.
(5) The secessionism of threatened cultures: if a minority culture is threatened 
within a state that has a majority culture, the minority needs a right to form a state 
of its own which would protect its culture” (Pavkovic 2003).
Many African conflicts occur because people seeking ways of asserting their dis-
tinctive identity found that they had no means by which they could give expres-
sion to their distinctiveness. Moore argues that right to secession comes in as a last 
resort to end the intractable conflict (Moore 2003:5–6). Moore also argues that 
secession is justified if, and only if, the encompassing state has completely failed to 
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ensure basic human rights and the secured survival of a group (Moore 2003:5–6). 
Therefore, the right to secession within the framework of remedial right literature is 
to protect the existence of a minority against grave injustices. Buchanan suggests 
three kinds of injustices that are rampant in the internal conflict: “large-scale and 
persistent violations of basic individual human rights, unjust taking of a legitimate 
state’s territory, and the violation of intrastate autonomy agreements” (Buchanan 
2003:219–220). Such internal conflicts, if not dealt with have the capacity to spread 
beyond the borders of the state in question, and therefore pose threats to interna-
tional peace and security.
While the right to remedial secession might have guaranteed peace on other conti-
nents, in Africa it has not been the case. The case of recurrence of conflict in South 
Sudan after the country had seceded from North Sudan shows that the right of seces-
sion in Africa does not necessarily lead to peace and security. Factors that have led 
to the right to secession in Africa failing to ensure peace are the lack of political will 
and patriotism, corruption, greedy leaders, and ethnic differences on the continent. 
These factors make it difficult for peace during the secession and its aftermath. Over 
a 30-year period the separation of the Eritrean territory from Ethiopia changed from 
a completely unthinkable option to the preferred solution for settling the conflict. 
Joireman’s study on Ethiopia and Eritrea found that when secession did occur, it did 
not have the intended consequence of eliminating violent conflict, but rather it intensi-
fied and violent conflict between Eritreans and other states increased (Schneckener et 
al. 2004:178–179).
CONCLUSIONS
As Iglar argues, self-determination gives certain people a right to exercise local auton-
omy (Iglar 1992). In some cases, self-determination has led to secession while in some 
other cases it has not been the case. As was discussed, for self-determination to entail 
an automatic right to secession, all the criteria must be met. It was found that the right 
to self-determination still embodies the concept it was founded upon: the removal of 
alien rule; and governance freely determined by the people. However, the interpreta-
tion as to the people entitled to the right and whether they comprehend secession; is 
an ongoing debate. For this reason, this right does not entail an automatic secession, in 
many cases it entails referendum and it is not automatic that referendum will certainly 
go through. As argued by Onyeonoro, the right to self-determination cannot mean 
the freedom of every self-distinguishing ethno-cultural group to secede from an estab-
lished state on a whim (Onyeonoro 1974:355–376). Therefore, self-determination does 
not entail an automatic secession.
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It was also found that the right to secession does not automatically guarantee peace 
and security. This is because, while secession separates the oppressor and oppressed 
and guarantees a kind of reprieve to the oppressed, it does not deal with the root 
causes of the conflicts. As witnessed in many cases in Africa, the reprieved oppressed 
normally turn into tyrants and end up oppressing the people they said they were 
liberating. Moore (2003) and Pavkovic and Radan (2007), say that the right to seces-
sion remains wanting since in most secessionist struggles injustices do occur, but are 
not the root cause of conflict. Consider South Sudan’s history that was marred by 
internal political conflicts between Christians and Muslims led by the government 
of Khartoum. Secession which granted South Sudan independence has failed to end 
the crisis and lead to peace. The new-born country is currently suffering from violent 
conflicts along ethnic lines, with new concerns being echoed that tensions might 
increase over the distribution of state resources, threatening both national and inter-
national peace. Hence, self-determination does not necessarily entail an automatic 
right to secession, and at the same time, right to secession does not automatically lead 
to peace and security.
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